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IN DEFENSE OF THE PANOPTICON 
 
William H. Simon 
 
 Anxiety about surveillance and data mining has led many 
to embrace implausibly expansive and rigid conceptions of 
privacy. Activists seem to have lost touch with the reservations 
about privacy expressed in the social criticism of some decades 
ago. They seem unable to imagine that pre-occupation with 
privacy might amount to a “pursuit of loneliness” or that “eyes on 
the street” might have reassuring connotations. Without denying 
the importance of the effort to define and secure privacy values, I 
want to catalogue and push back against some key rhetorical 
tropes that distort current discussion and practice. 
 One problem is that privacy defenses often imply a degree 
of pessimism about the state that is inconsistent with the strong 
general public regulatory and social-welfare role that many 
defenders favor. Another is a sentimental disposition toward past 
convention that obscures the potential contributions of new 
technologies to both order and justice. And a third is a narrow 
conception of personality that exalts extreme individual control 
over information at the expense of sharing and sociability.  
 
I. Paranoia 
 
 In urban areas, most people’s activity outdoors and in the 
common spaces of buildings is recorded most of the time. 
Surveillance cameras are everywhere. When people move around, 
their paths are registered on building access cards or subway fare 
cards or automobile toll devices. Their telephone and e-mail 
communications, internet searches, and movements are tracked by 
telephone companies and other intermediaries. All their credit card 
transactions – which for many people, means nearly all of their 
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transactions -- are documented by time, place, and substance. The 
health system extracts and records detailed information about their 
psychic and bodily functions. Anyone arrested, and many who fear 
arrest, in the criminal justice system typically surrender a variety 
of personal information and often have to submit to ongoing 
monitoring. Even within the home, water and energy consumption 
is monitored, and some people choose to install cameras to 
monitor children or protect against burglars. 
 To many people, this society looks like the Panopticon – a 
prison designed as a circular tower so that the inmates can be 
easily observed by a centrally located authority figure. Jeremy 
Bentham originated the Panopticon idea as a low-cost form of 
subjugation for convicted criminals. Michel Foucault adopted it as 
a metaphor for what he regarded as the insidiously pervasive 
forms of social control in contemporary society. To him, schools, 
hospitals, workplaces, and government agencies all engaged in 
repressive forms of surveillance analogous to the Panopticon.  
 In the United States, paranoid political style has been 
associated traditionally with the right and the less educated. But 
Foucault helped made it attractive to liberal intellectuals. His 
contribution was largely a matter of style. Foucault was the most 
moralistic of social theorists, but he purported to disdain morality 
(“normativity”) and refused to acknowledge, much less defend, the 
moral implications of his arguments. He gave intellectual 
respectability to the three principal tropes of the paranoid style.  
 First, there is the idea of guilt by association. The 
resemblance between some feature of a strikingly cruel or 
crackpot regime of the past or in fiction (especially in 1984) and a 
more ambiguous contemporary one is emphasized in order to 
condemn the latter. Thus, the elaborate individualized calibration 
of tortures in 18
th
 and 19
th
 century penology is used to make us 
feel uncomfortable about the graduated responses to 
noncompliance in contemporary drug treatment courts. Orwell’s 
image of television cameras transmitting images from inside the 
home to the political police is used to induce anxiety about devices 
that monitor electricity usage so that the hot water tank will re-
heat during off-peak hours.  
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 The second trope of the paranoid style is the portrayal of 
virtually all tacit social pressure as insidious. What people 
experience as voluntary choice is substantially conditioned by 
unconscious internalized dispositions to conform to norms, and a 
key mechanism of such conformity is the actual, imagined, or 
anticipated gaze of others. Almost everyone who thinks about it 
recognizes that such pressures are potentially benign, but people 
differ in their rhetorical predispositions toward them. The 
individualist streak in American culture tends to exalt individual 
choice in a way that makes social influence suspect.  
Foucault disdained individualism, but he introduced a 
conception of “power” that was so vague and sinister that it could 
be applied to make almost any social force seem creepy. When 
Neil Richards writes in the Harvard Law Review that surveillance 
“affects the power dynamic between the watcher and the watched, 
giving the watcher greater power to influence or direct the subject 
of surveillance,” he is channeling Foucault. So is Julie Cohen, 
when she writes in the Stanford Law Review: “Pervasive 
monitoring of every first move or false start will, at the margin, 
incline choices toward the bland and the mainstream.” 
 We have come a far cry from Jane Jacobs’s idea of “eyes 
on the street” as the critical foundation of urban vibrancy. For 
Jacobs, the experience of being observed by diverse strangers 
induces, not anxiety or timidity, but an empowering sense of 
security and stimulation. It makes people willing to go out into 
new situations and to experiment with new behaviors. Eyes-on-
the-street implies a tacit social pact that people will intervene to 
protect each other’s safety but that they will refrain from judging 
their peers’ non-dangerous behavior. Electronic surveillance is not 
precisely the same thing as Jacobean eyes-on-the-street, but it does 
offer the combination of potentially benign intervention and the 
absence of censorious judgment that Jacobs saw as conducive to 
autonomy.  
 The third trope of the paranoid style is the “slippery slope” 
argument. The idea is that an innocuous step in a feared direction 
will inexorably lead to further steps that end in catastrophe. As 
The Music Man puts it in explaining why a pool table will lead to 
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moral collapse in River City, Iowa, “medicinal wine from a 
teaspoon, then beer from a bottle.” In this spirit, Daniel Solove in 
Nothing to Hide explains why broad surveillance is a threat even 
when limited to detection of unlawful activity: First, surveillance 
will sometimes lead to mistaken conclusions that will harm 
innocent people. Second, since “everyone violates the law 
sometimes” (think of moderate speeding on the highway), 
surveillance will lead to over-enforcement of low-stakes laws 
(presumably by lowering the costs of enforcement), or perhaps the 
use of threats of enforcement of minor misconduct to force people 
to give up rights (as for example, where police threaten to bring 
unrelated charges in order to induce a witness or co-conspirator to 
cooperate in the prosecution of another). And finally, even if we 
authorize broad surveillance for legitimate purposes, officials will 
use the authorization as an excuse to extend their activities in 
illegitimate ways. 
 Yet, “slippery slope” arguments can be made against 
virtually any kind of law enforcement. Most law enforcement 
infringes privacy. (“Murder is the most private act a man can 
commit,” William Faulkner wrote.) And most law enforcement 
powers have the potential for abuse. What we can reasonably ask 
is, first, that the practices are calibrated effectively to identify 
wrongdoers; second, that the burden they put on law-abiding 
people is fairly distributed; and third, that officials are accountable 
for the lawfulness of their conduct both in designing and in 
implementing the practices.  
The capacity of broad-based electronic surveillance that 
collects data on large or indeterminate numbers of people who 
are not identified in advance to satisfy these conditions is in 
some respects higher than that of the more targeted and reactive 
approaches that privacy advocates prefer. Targeted approaches 
rely heavily on personal observation by police and witnesses, 
reports by informants of self-inculpatory statements by suspects, 
and confessions. Scholars in recent years have emphasized the 
fallibility of human memory and observation: Witness reports of 
conduct by strangers are often mistaken and influenced by 
investigators. Those who report self-inculpatory statements often 
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have dubious motivations, and, with surprising frequency, even 
confessions prove unreliable. 
 Inferences from broad-based electronic surveillance are 
not infallible, but they are often more reliable than reports of 
personal observation, and they can be less intrusive. Computers 
programmed to identify and photograph red light violations make 
much more reliable determinations of the violation than a police 
officer relying on his own observation. And they are less intrusive: 
the camera can be set to record only when there’s a violation, 
whereas a police officer would observe and remember much more. 
Yet, many civil libertarians, including some ACLU affiliates, 
oppose them. One of their key arguments is that the systems 
generate tickets in many situations where the driver might have 
had an excuse for not stopping in time that would have persuaded 
a police officer to excuse the violation. (The case for excuse can 
still be made in court, but a court appearance would cost more 
than the ticket for many.) The argument is not frivolous, but it is a 
curiousity typical of this field that people concerned about the 
abuse of state power oppose new technology in favor of 
procedures that give officials more discretion. 
 For democratic accountability, Panopticon-style 
surveillance has an under-appreciated advantage. It may more 
easily accommodate transparency. Electronic surveillance is 
governed by fully specified algorithms. Thus, disclosure of the 
algorithms gives a full picture of the practices. By contrast, when 
government agents are told to scan for suspicious behavior, we 
know very little about what criteria they are using. Even if we 
require the agents to articulate their criteria, they may be unable to 
do so comprehensively. The concern is not just about good faith, 
but also about unconscious predisposition. Psychologists have 
provided extensive evidence of pervasive, unconscious bias based 
on race and other social stereotypes and stigma. Algorithm-
governed electronic surveillance has no such bias.  
 The Panopticon can be developed in ways Foucault never 
imagined to discipline the watchers as well as the watched.  The 
most vocal demands for electronic surveillance in prisons these 
days come from prisoners and their advocates.  Lawsuits 
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challenging physical abuse by guards often produce court orders 
requiring increased deployment of video cameras and restricting 
guards’ ability to take prisoners to areas where they are not 
recorded.  People who worry about coerced confessions favor 
mandatory taping of police interviews of suspects, and many 
jurisdictions have adopted this practice.  One response to 
complaints of racial profiling in pedestrian or vehicle stops has 
been to have police wear cameras that tape every encounter.  Some 
civil libertarians oppose such practices, but those who favor them 
are trying to restrain state power, not enlarge it.  
 More generally, broad-reach electronic mechanisms have 
an advantage in addressing the danger that surveillance will be 
unfairly concentrated on particular groups.  Targeting criteria, 
rather than reflecting rigorous efforts to identify wrongdoers, may 
reflect cognitive bias or group animus. Moreover, even when the 
criteria are optimally calculated to identify wrongdoers, they may 
be unfair to law-abiding people who happen to share some 
superficial characteristic with wrongdoers. Thus, law-abiding 
blacks complain that they are unfairly burdened by stop-and-frisk 
tactics, and law-abiding Muslims make similar complaints about 
anti-terrorism surveillance.  
 Such problems are more tractable with broad-based 
electronic surveillance. Because it is broad-based, it 
distributes some of its burdens widely. This may be 
intrinsically fairer, and it operates as a political safeguard, 
making effective protest more likely in cases of abuse. 
Because it is electronic, the efficacy of the criteria can be more 
easily investigated, and their effect on law-abiding people can be 
more accurately documented. Thus, plaintiffs in challenges to 
stop-and-frisk practices analyze electronically recorded data on 
racial incidence and “hit rates” to argue that the criteria are biased 
and the effects racially skewed. Remedies in such cases typically 
require more extensive recording. 
 The critics’ pre-occupation with the dangers of state 
oppression often leads them to overlook the dangers of private 
surveillance. The critics have a surprisingly difficult time coming 
up with actual examples of serious harm from government 
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surveillance abuse. Instead, they tend to talk about the “chilling 
effect” from awareness of surveillance.  
By contrast, there have been many examples of serious 
harm from private abuse of personal information gained from 
digital sources. At least one person has committed suicide as a 
consequence of the internet publication of video showing him 
engaged in sexual activity. Many people have been humiliated by 
private recording and publication of intimate conduct, and 
blackmail based on threats of such disclosure has emerged as a 
common practice. Some of this private abuse is and should be 
illegal. But the legal prohibitions can only be enforced if the 
government has some of the surveillance capacities that critics 
decry. It must be able to identify the wrongdoers and sanction their 
misconduct. Less compromising critics would deny government 
these capacities.   
With falling crime rates and small risks of terrorism in the 
United States, privacy advocates do not feel compelled to address 
the potential chilling effect on speech and conduct that arises from 
fear of private lawlessness, but we do not have to look far to see 
examples of such an effect abroad and to recognize that its 
magnitude depends on the effectiveness of public law 
enforcement. To the extent that law enforcement is enhanced by 
surveillance, we ought to recognize the possibility of a “warming 
effect” that strengthens people’s confidence that they can act and 
speak without fear of private aggression.  
 
II. Nostalgia 
 
  Harm from surveillance that intrudes on core areas of 
solitude and intimacy is easy to identify. Such intrusion is rightly 
subject to high burdens of justification. But most surveillance is 
different. Often it involves conduct subject to ordinary observation 
in public or information that a person has willingly provided to 
strangers, often to facilitate business or commercial dealings.  
 Once we go beyond the solitary-intimate realm, it 
becomes harder to delimit the scope of privacy concerns. A 
common approach is to privilege assumptions based on past 
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experience. Thus, the Supreme Court elaborates the constitutional 
prohibition of “unreasonable searches and seizures” by looking to 
“expectations of privacy.” Expectations are a function of custom. 
It follows that telescopically-aided airplane surveillance of 
someone in his backyard is generally OK because we are used to 
telescopes and airplanes flying over. Using thermal imaging 
technology to look inside the house requires a warrant because it is 
a technology to which we are not yet habituated. Helen 
Nissenbaum, in her highly-regarded Privacy in Context, takes a 
similar approach. Her guiding principle is “contextual integrity,” 
which means the implicit customary norms in any given sphere of 
activity. If a highway toll collector sees contraband in the backseat 
of a car, that’s not a problem because such observation is familiar. 
But if the police examine electronic toll records to see if the car 
was near the scene of a crime at the relevant time, that’s a privacy 
problem. 
 Here again we see people of generally liberal views 
resorting to conservative rhetorical and theoretical tropes when it 
comes to privacy. Most privacy advocates probably consider the 
appeal to custom in arguments about the death penalty or gay 
marriage as a sign of intellectual bankruptcy. The distinctions that 
the customary principle produces seem arbitrary in relation to any 
substantive conception of privacy.  
 The substantive conception to which the advocates are 
most drawn is the notion of a right to control information about 
one’s self. James Whitman argues in the Yale Law Journal that 
this conception evolved through the democratization of aristocratic 
values. The aristocrat’s sense of self-worth and dignity depended 
on respect from peers and deference from subordinates, and both 
were a function of his public image. Image was thus treated as a 
kind of personal property. Whitman says this view continues to 
influence the European middle class in the age of equal 
citizenship. As the ideal was democratized, it came to be seen as a 
foundation for self-expression and individual development. 
 European law evolved to express this cultural change. 
Whitman showed that the idea of a right to control one’s public 
image underlies French and German privacy law, and it appears to 
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animate European Union privacy law, which advocates admire for 
its stronger protections than those of US law. For example, French 
and German law impose stricter limits on credit reporting and the 
use of consumer data than US law. The EU directive mandates that 
individuals be given notice of the data collection practices of those 
with whom they deal and rights to correct erroneous data about 
them. More controversially, a proposed revision prohibits 
decisions based “solely on automatic data processing” for various 
purposes, including employment and credit. By contrast, US law 
tends to be less protective and less general. Its privacy law tends to 
be sectoral, with distinctive regulations for health care, education, 
law enforcement, and other fields. 
 Whitman associates the weaker influence of the idea of 
personal image-control in the US with the stronger influence here 
of competing libertarian notions that broadly protect speech and 
publication. Expansive notions of privacy require a more active 
state to enforce them. This was recently illustrated by a decision of 
the EU Court of Justice holding that the “right to be forgotten” 
may require removal from an internet website of true but “no 
longer relevant” information about the plaintiff’s default on a debt. 
The prospect of courts reviewing internet data to determine when 
personal information is “no longer relevant” has emphasized the 
potential conflict between privacy and other civil rights. 
 But reservations about the broad conception of dignity 
Whitman describes go deeper. There is a powerful moral objection 
to it grounded in ideals of sociability. Even in Europe, during the 
period in which the ideal was democratized, there was a prominent 
critique of it. A character in a 19
th
 century English novel pre-
occupied with controlling his public image is likely to be a 
charlatan or a loser. Not for nothing is Sherlock Holmes the most 
prominent hero in the canon. His talents are devoted to invading 
the privacy of those who would use their image-management 
rights to exploit others. And as he teaches that the façade of self-
presentation can be penetrated by observation and analysis of such 
matters as frayed cuffs, scratches on a watch, or a halting gait, he 
sets up as a competing value the capacity to know and deal with 
people on our terms as well as theirs. 
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 Even among innocuous characters, pre-occupation with 
image control often appears as a pathology that inhibits rather than 
enhances self-expression and development. This pre-occupation is 
associated with a rejection of urban life and its spontaneity and 
diversity. Think of Sir Leicester Dedlock in Bleak House and 
Sir Walter Elliot in Persuasion, minor nobles clinging to 
aristocratic ideals. They know that the best way to maintain 
control of your image is to avoid contact with strangers, 
people you have no power over, and clever people who 
might penetrate your disguises. To embrace the vitality of 
the city requires a willingness to give up some control over 
one’s image and accept risks of being understood and dealt 
with on terms that are not your own. In both books, the 
unwillingness to run these risks is associated with personal 
stultification.  
 If the right to control personal information was extended 
in Europe from the aristocracy to the rest of the society, it was at 
the same time diluted for everyone. When Darcy leaves his estate 
at Pemberley, he exits a world in which he is “seen as he chooses 
to be seen,” as the scoundrel Wickham puts it enviously. In the 
middle class world of Meryton, he is subjected to eavesdropping 
and gossip (the social media of yesteryear). And he is confronted 
by people, notably Lizzie Bennet, who dare to “read [his] 
character” back to him in their own manner. In the process of 
responding, he grows and finds romantic fulfillment but only by 
giving up control. Pride and Prejudice, perhaps the most popular 
novel written in English, is a treatise on the impossibility and 
undesirability of giving anyone control over the information about 
himself.  
 As there are emotional and social benefits to giving up 
control over personal information; so are there are economic 
benefits.  It is not unfair to take account of people’s credit histories 
in making loan decisions.  When lenders do this effectively, credit 
is, on average, cheaper.  Nor does it seem especially unfair to take 
account of a factor like the purchase of home safety devices that 
predicts relevant behavior like repayment of a loan.  Some uses of 
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personal information should be prohibited.  Where predictive 
information tracks axes of historical subordination, such as race 
and gender, there may be good reason to limit its use, as the law 
does with respect to various insurance decisions.  The reason, 
however, has to do with concerns about subordination, not some 
broad right of privacy.  The US sectoral approach is better 
equipped to take account of the varying and competing stakes than 
the EU categorical one. 
 
   
  
III. Individualism 
 
A major goal of many privacy proponents is to limit 
collection of personal data either by regulations requiring 
affirmative consent for such collection or by technology that limits 
reading or retaining the data. They don’t want, for example, 
Google to be able to analyze people’s Internet searches or state 
governments to be able to analyze highway toll payment data 
without specific consent, or perhaps a warrant. They also advocate 
technologies such as the hardware-software package offered by the 
Freedom Box Foundation designed to enable users to thwart 
mining of their data over the Internet. 
 Advocates object most strongly to data collection 
designed to yield specific conclusions about the individual, but 
they persist even when anonymized data is used to assess general 
patterns. Since anonymization is never perfectly secure, there 
remains some risk to the subjects. Moreover, the privacy norm 
sometimes shades into a property norm. It turns out that some 
people carry around economically valuable information in their 
bodies – for example, the DNA code for a substance with 
therapeutic potential -- and that information about everyone’s 
conduct and physical condition can, when aggregated, be sold for 
substantial sums.  For some, the extraction of such information 
without consent looks like expropriation of property. They would 
like to see explicit recognition of property rights to personal 
information that could not be infringed without consent and 
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compensation. In Who Owns the Future? Jaron Lanier develops 
this line of thought, suggesting that we create institutions that 
enable individuals to “monetize” their personal data—individual 
accounts would be credited every time a piece of data is used. 
 In addressing such issues, a lot depends on how we 
understand “consent.” Consent can mean clicking on an “I agree to 
the terms” button that refers to a mass of small-print boilerplate 
that hardly anyone can be expected to read. Or it may mean simply 
the failure to find and click on the button that says “I refuse 
consent.” The advocates want something more demanding. 
Moreover, they don’t want the cost of the decision to be too high. 
If insisting on privacy means exclusion from Google’s search tool 
or Amazon’s retail service, many proponents would view that as 
unfair. If Google or Amazon charged a price for not mining your 
data, many would call it extortion – like asking someone to pay in 
order not to be assaulted. So the idea of “consent” touches on deep 
and unresolved issues of entitlement to information.  
Such issues have arisen in connection with employer-
sponsored “wellness” programs that encourage employees to get 
check-ups that include a “health risk assessment” designed to 
generate prophylactic advice. At Pennsylvania State University 
such a program recently provoked a wave of privacy protests, 
apparently directed to parts of a questionnaire that addressed 
marital and job-related problems, among other things. The 
protesters also objected that the questionnaires would be analyzed 
by an “outside” consultant, even though the information would be 
subject to the confidentiality provisions of the federal Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. The University 
allowed people to refuse to participate subject to $100 per month 
premium surcharge.  
 No doubt such programs may be unnecessarily intrusive 
and may not safeguard information adequately, but the objections 
made in this case do not appear to have depended on such 
concerns. The $100 surcharge was based an estimate of the 
average additional health costs attributable to refusal to 
participate. The premise of the protests seems to have been that the 
interest in not disclosing this information even under substantial 
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safeguards is important enough that those who disclose should be 
asked to subsidize those who do not.  
 Social change often raises new questions about rights. 
When airplanes first appeared over people’s homes, the question 
arose whether they were trespassing; when zoning codes limited 
what owners could build on their land, the question arose whether 
government had “taken” a portion of the individual’s property, and 
was thus obliged to compensate them. More often than not, the 
law has refused to recognize claims of this sort. One reason has 
been fear that they would preclude many generally advantageous 
social practices. Another has been the belief that, except where the 
costs imposed by the practices cumulate visibly on particular 
individuals or groups, they are likely to even out over the long run. 
In a famous opinion declining to hold that a regulation of coal 
mining violated property rights, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
spoke of an “average reciprocity of advantage” that over time 
obviated the need for individual compensation by distributing 
benefits evenly across the society. 
 The reciprocity theme occasionally surfaces in privacy 
discussion. Lanier’s proposal to monetize data arises from a sense 
of injustice about the relative rewards to, on the one hand, data-
mining entrepreneurs and high-tech knowledge workers, and on 
the other, the masses of people whose principal material 
endowment may be their control over their own personal 
information. In the health sector, doctors have been caught trying 
to derive patent rights from information embedded in their 
patients’ DNA without informing the patients. 
 But privacy advocates rarely acknowledge the possibility 
that “average reciprocity of advantage” will obviate over time the 
need for individual compensation in some areas. Might it be the 
case, as with airplanes and zoning laws, that people will do better 
if individual data (anonymized where appropriate) is made freely 
available except where risks to individuals are unreasonably high 
or gains or losses are detectably concentrated? There will always 
be a risk that some data will be disclosed in harmful ways; for 
example when, personal data leaks out because of ineffective 
anonymization. However, the key question is whether we will 
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make a social judgment about what level of risk is reasonable or 
whether we shall accord property rights that allow each individual 
to make her own risk calculus with respect to her own data.  
The latter approach would likely preclude valuable 
practices in ways analogous to what would happen if airlines had 
to get owners’ consent for passing over private property. 
Moreover, strengthening rights in personal data could exacerbate, 
rather than mitigate, distributive fairness concerns. While it is 
surely unfair for doctors to earn large capital gains from DNA 
extracted without consent, wouldn’t it also be unfair (admittedly in 
a lower key) for Freedom-Box-users to benefit from the Center for 
Disease Control’s mining of Google searches for new viruses 
while denying access to their own internet searches? 
 The strong privacy position has disturbing implications for 
medical research. In the past, medicine has strongly separated 
research from treatment. Research is paradigmatically associated 
randomized control clinical trials. Treatment experience has been 
considered less useful to research because treatment records do not 
describe the condition of the patient or the nature of the 
intervention with enough specificity to permit rigorous 
comparisons. But information technology is removing this 
limitation, and, as the capacity to analyze treatment information 
rigorously increases, the quality of research could improve as its 
cost lowers. 
 However, this development is in some tension with 
expansive conceptions of privacy. A prominent group of 
bioethicists led by Ruth Faden of Johns Hopkins has argued that 
the emerging “learning health care system” will require a moral 
framework that “depart[s] in important respects from 
contemporary conceptions of clinical and research ethics.” A key 
component of the framework is a newly recognized obligation on 
the part of patients to contribute to medical research. The 
obligation involves a duty to permit disclosure and use of 
anonymized treatment data for research purposes and perhaps also 
to undergo some unburdensome and non-invasive examination and 
testing required for research but not for individual treatment. 
(Anonymization is unlikely to be effective with data made 
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generally available on-line, but regimes involving selective and 
monitored disclosure have proven reliable.) The group justifies its 
proposal in terms of reciprocity values. Since everyone has a good 
prospect of benefiting from research, refusing to contribute to it is 
unfair free-riding.  
 Of course, the reciprocity idea assumes that researchers 
will make the fruits of the research derived from patient 
information freely available. People would be reluctant to agree to 
make a gift of their information if researchers could use it to make 
themselves rich. Effective constraints on such conduct should be 
feasible. Much medical research, including much of the highest 
value research, has been and continues to be done by salaried 
employees of charitable corporations.  
 Applied in this context, Lanier’s proposal to monetize 
individual data looks unattractive. There’s a danger that lots of 
valuable information would be withheld or that the costs of 
negotiating for it would divert a lot of resources from research and 
treatment. It is not clear what the resulting redistributive effects 
would be. Perhaps they would approximate a lottery in which the 
only winners would be a small number of people with little in 
common except that they happened to possess personal 
information that had high research value at the moment. At a point 
where we do not know who the winners will be, we would all be 
better off giving up our chances for a big payoff in return for 
assurance that we will have free access to valuable information. 
We can do this by treating the information as part of a common 
pool.  
 If it were the only way of transferring resources to the 
economically disadvantaged, monetization might be defensible as 
a social policy of desperation. But it seems a shabby and 
inefficient substitute for decent set of public institutions to 
discipline monopolistic power, provide public goods, and 
guarantee basic income, education, and health care. Astra Taylor 
agues compellingly in The People’s Platform that techno-futurist 
discourse suffers from deep skepticism about public institutions. 
Yet, much of the current information techno-structure is a product 
of publicly initiated and supported research. There is no reason to 
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think that the capacities for creative innovation that the futurists 
celebrate cannot be applied effectively in the public realm. 
 The Panopticon metaphor emphasizes the undeniable 
dangers of domination in the new information technology.  But 
there is also a promise of enhanced forms of social connection and 
collaboration.  Bunkering into individualistic rights notions as a 
defense of traditional privacy risks stifling this potential. 
